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Abstract
The  Water  Framework  Directive  (WFD)  is  perhaps  the  most  ambitious  piece  of 
environmental  legislation  in  the  history  of  the  European  Union.  The  Directive 
consolidates  existing  water-related  legislation  and  has  the  stated  objective  of 
delivering  good  status  (GS)  for  Europe’s  surface  waters  and  groundwaters.    But 
meeting GS is cost dependent, and in some water bodies pollution abatements costs 
may be high or judged as disproportionate. The exact definition and assessment of 
disproportionate costs is central for the justification of time-frame derogations and/or 
lowering the environmental objectives (standards) for compliance at a water body. 
Official  guidance  is  somewhat  discretionary  about  the  interpretation  of 
disproportionate costs.    Building on basic cost-benefit theory, this paper attempts to 
clarify  the  meaning  of  disproportionate  cost  to  non-economists,  and  to  convey  a 
consistent  interpretation  that  should  underlie  the  development  of  a  practical 
derogation decision making across all member states 
KEYWORDS: Derogations, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA), Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA), Marginal Abatement Costs (MAC), Marginal Social Costs (MSC)
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The European Water Framework Directive (WFD) (EC/2000/60) was adopted in 2000 
with the aim of consolidating and improving European water resource management. 
The WFD establishes a legal framework within which to protect surface and ground 
waters using  a common  management approach and following common objectives, 
principles,  and  basic  measures.  It  also  integrates  the  existing  European  water 
legislation into a common framework (De Nocker et al, 2007).
The two main objectives of the WFD are (i) to restore good ecological and chemical 
status for all water bodies across the Community by 2015 and (ii) to integrate water 
management  activities  at  the  river  basin  level.  To  this  end,  Member  States  have 
identified river basin districts and designated the competent administrative authorities. 
The next step is to produce River Basin Management Plans, which is an ongoing 
process until 2009. The implementation of these management plans will then take 
place in three phases: 2009-2015, 2015-2021 and 2021-2027 (EC, 2000).  
There is much to debate about the design and interpretation of the WFD, not least its 
economic  underpinning  and  whether  the  Directive  can  be  shown  to  confer  net 
benefits.  Irrespective of its aggregate economic efficiency, there is a question about 
how the designation of an ecological target translates into costs and benefits within 
different river basins.  The incidence of costs is of particular interest to stakeholders 
with some industries inevitably being more implicated in the drive to cut pollution.   
This eventuality was foreseen in the design of the Directive, with a provision for 
conceding exemptions for the achievement of these objectives; such as to grant time-
frame  derogations  to  achieve  Good  Status,  or  permitting  the  lowering  of 
environmental standards (from good status to good potential) when a water user finds 
the total costs of the most cost-effective programme of measures too expensive or 
disproportionately expensive to undertake (EC, 2000).  Inevitably this provision is 
being  invoked  by  some  industries,  with  ensuing  debate  about  the  legitimacy  of 
exemptions being claimed on this basis.   
Existing guidance on the topic of disproportionality does not offer clear advice to 
implementing states on the definition of disproportional costs. The case is nominally  to be decided by individual member states on a case-by-case basis. The European 
guidance  states  that  its  assessment  has  to  be  the  outcome  of  a  political  decision 
informed by the economic analysis (EC, 2002). However, this guidance only vaguely 
recommends the use of simple financial criteria for time-frame derogations and the 
application of cost-benefit analysis theory for seeking less stringent objectives.
The  inevitable  outcome  is  different  definitions  being  applied  across  water  bodies 
between different Member States.  Accordingly, this paper focuses on the economic 
interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  disproportionate  costs  for  the  practical 
implementation  of  the  Water  Framework  Directive  (WFD).  We  consider  the 
implications for the agricultural sector. The paper has been structured as follows. In 
the first section we set the question of disproportionality in the context of the basic 
economics of pollution control theory and the equi-marginal value principle.  The 
next section considers the definition  of Good Status and alternative definitions  of 
disproportional costs consistent with rudimentary cost-effectiveness or cost benefit 
analysis principles.   The final section reflects on the implications for a hypothetical 
farm,  where  theoretical  exactitude  may  ultimately  come  second  to  a  practical 
definition  that  regulators  can  employ  quickly  and  practically  when  deciding  on 
whether costs are disproportionate.
The WFD and  the economics of pollution control 
While the Directive has clear ecological objectives, for many their attainment  is set in 
terms  that  are  fundamentally  economic.  Thus,  costs  of  use,  cost  recovery,  the 
recognition  of  the  need  to  value  benefits…  emphasise  the  economic  attributes  of 
water use. But from the outset there has been diverging views about the extent to 
which economic theory can be reconciled with administrative realities and limited 
regulatory capacity in many Member States.  Economic theory does provide a useful 
reference point. 
From a neo-classical  welfare  economics perspective,  environmental degradation is 
depicted as one in which the activity of an economic agent (any economic agent: 
households, firms, governments) imposes external costs upon the rest of society in the 
form of pollution (Baumol and Oates 1988). This damage may be mediated through for example pollution of a water body such as a lake. This is the perfect example of a 
market failure.  Prices, or the lack of them, fail to produce an efficient allocation of 
resources,  leaving  polluters  free  use  of  the  environment  beyond  its  assimilative 
capacity. Pollution  is  then analysed,  from  an  economic  perspective,  as  a negative 
externality. Parties who suffer the consequences of the polluting activity experience a 
loss of welfare or utility (Pearce, 1974).  Conversely, society benefits from mitigation 
or restoration programmes. 
For  the  design  of  environmental  protection  policies,  economists  aim  to  find  the 
appropriate set of prices to be paid by the polluter to compensate for the negative 
impact of their activities, in an attempt to internalise any loss of welfare that the 
“victims”  of  this  activity  may  have  suffered.  The  overall  objective  is  to  create 
competitive markets for the use of environmental assets, as they (in theory) would 
produce (in equilibrium) a pareto-efficient allocation of resources, where no economic 
agent (polluter or the victim) would be worse off as a result of any actions taken, 
implying no loss of welfare (Varian, 2003). 
For the last 40 years, economists have applied the principles of microeconomic and 
welfare economic theory in the advocacy of efficient pollution control policies, with 
the  underlying  objective  of  using  economic  instruments  to  find  the  economically 
optimal level of pollution (Baumol and Oates 1988). These instruments are designed 
to provide the necessary financial incentives for polluters to reduce the environmental 
degradation associated with their activities in order to achieve a (so called) “socially” 
desired  environmental  objective  (Hanley  et  al,  1997).  Some  examples  of  these 
instruments  are:  pollution  taxes/charges  (piguvian  taxes),  pollution  reduction 
subsidies, tradable emission permits.
Figure 1 introduces the basic economics of pollution control (adapted from Pearce and 
Turner, 1990; Varian, 2003 and ECO2, 2004). To simplify the analysis, the graph 
depicts one single factory which discharges nitrogen loads into the nearest river (one 
polluter, one water body), resulting in environmental damage.Figure 1:  The basic economics of pollution control
The figure depicts the marginal cost curves for pollution control and damage costs. 
The diagram mirrors economic demand and supply theory. The curve for pollution 
control (supply side) reflects the increasing abatement/private costs that the company 
may incur in order to reduce its nitrogen emissions into the river by one extra unit
3. 
And the damage curve reflects the avoided (environmental and social) costs (demand 
side) associated with that environmental improvement.  In other words, the higher the 
pollution levels, the more people (or society) are willing to pay for unit reductions.  
Assuming  a  direct  dose-response  relationship  between  the  firm’s  output, 
environmental  protection  expenditure  and  environmental  quality  improvements, 
increasing  pollution  control  means  (in  the  graph)  that  damage  costs  decline 
(conversely the environmental/social benefits increase) meanwhile the firm’s control 
costs go up. Alternatively, low pollution control costs imply higher damage costs. 
In  theory, if both curves are known, any policy responses based on this information 
would result in an efficient allocation of pollution control and the value Q* would represent the “socially” desired level of water quality/pollution, equivalent (under the 
assumptions made) to point  E*, which  illustrates the pareto-efficient level of control 
of pollution/emissions. These points can be found on the X-axis where the firm’s 
marginal abatement costs, MAC, equal marginal social cost, MSC (Varian, 2003). As 
an example of the many applications of this ‘equi-marginal value’ theorem, the point 
P*  can  be  used  to  set  pollution  charges  (or  piguvian  taxes),  assuming  that  the 
pollution control costs curve represents private costs of remediation measures for the 
firm (MCA) and the environmental damage costs curve represents social costs (MSC) 
under perfect competition (Hanley et al, 1997).
Application to WFD
The same basic  framework  can be used  throughout  to  illustrate the economics of 
water resources pollution control applied to the implementation of the WFD. These 
concepts  ultimately  allow  us  to  clarify disproportionate  cost.  Assume  that  we  are 
dealing with nitrogen emissions of one single firm/polluter altering the water quality 
of a river. We begin the analysis by introducing the definition of Good Status, the 
environmental target of the Directive. This is followed by a graphic representation of 
Cost  Effectiveness Analysis  (CEA)  and the firm’s  financial efforts  to  achieve the 
environmental requirements of the WFD. This leads to a more complete consideration 
of the role of Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
Defining 'Good Status'
The definition of ‘good status’ as the objective of the WFD is clearly the driver of 
much of the subsequent cost analysis underlying the implementation of the Directive.  
Clearly a fixed ecological standard implies a degree of inflexibility in implementation, 
which in some circumstances will imply that costs of compliance can exceed benefits.  
The  ability  to  modify  or  seek  derogation  from  compliance  means  that  ecological 
rigour has to be balanced against economic criteria.  Effectively, the standard-setting 
process  will  determine  whether  the  uptake  of  measures  to  reduce  environmental 
                                                                                                                                           
3 Note the important difference in economics between total and marginal costs. Marginal cost indicates 
the change in costs as we consider reducing one more unit of pollution. pollution will be enough to achieve ‘good status’ by 2015, and if not, which will be 
the gap between the actual levels of water pollution and the target standard. 
Subject to annex V of the Directive, each member state is required to define Good 
Status in terms of those environmental standards that will help to support the biology 
of  the  water  environment.  In  Britain,  The  UK-TAG
4  is  currently  engaged  in  the 
definition of Good Status (including the design of the environmental standards and the 
development  of  the  classification  schemes)  and  has  recently  published  for 
consultation  the  1
st  phase  of  their  programme:  “UK  environmental  standards  and 
conditions” (UK-TAG 2006). 
As biological parameters are the key component of the definition of good status, the 
standards are being defined according to the relevant status class boundaries (high, 
good, moderate, poor and bad) that compare to different levels of biological quality 
elements (e.g. covering algae, fish plants, etc…) for the different types of surface 
water  bodies  (e.g.  rivers,  lakes…).  In  consequence  and  following  the  Directive’s 
definitions, the UK-TAG is designing (or updating in case of existing legislation) the 
following environmental standards for the water quality of rivers in the UK (see table 
1). The table also describes how different standards are being designed.
                                                
4 The United Kingdom Technical Advisory Group (UKTAG), group created to provide advice on the 
technical/scientific side of the implementation of the Directive, is a partnership of the UK environment 
and conservation agencies. http://www.wfduk.org/Table 1: Environmental conditions, types and design of standards for rivers in the 
UK under the WFD
Environmental condition Type of standard Standards Design
I) General Water quality (Ecological status class  boundaries: High, Good, Moderate, Poor and Bad)
General physico-chemical 
quality elements
Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) 
and dissolved oxygen demand 
(DOD), Ammonia
pH
Nutrient: Phosphorus and other (not 
defined yet)
Temperature (not defined yet)
Salinity (not defined yet)
Use of numeric values that have been 
referenced to ecology
Water flow and water 
levels
Change from natural flow conditions Numeric values supported by hydrological 
modelling, based upon the best available 
understanding of links to ecology
Morphological quality 
elements
Type and degree of physical 
alteration (physical structure and 
condition of the bed, banks and 
shores)
Development of a decision framework 
based on best available knowledge 
supported by numeric thresholds
II) Chemical pollutants (Chemical status class boundaries: Good and Not Good)
Toxic pollutants (called 
specific pollutants) 
Standards for pollutants discharged in 
significant quantities 
- Priority substances, Environmental 
Quality Standards (EQSs) design at 
European level
- Dangerous substances: listed annex IX 
WFD
Source: (UK-TAG, 2006)
The designed standards will be for the whole of the UK (and fully compliant with the 
WFD requirements and other Directives). The approach to their implementation will 
be administration-specific, depending on different existing and proposed legislative 
and  policy  regimes,  for  each  country  within  the  UK  (e.g.  the  ways  in  which 
abstraction  is  controlled  in  England  &  Wales,  Northern  Ireland  and  Scotland  are 
different). For the first river basin cycle (to be ready by 2015), where knowledge on 
the actual status of the water environment is more limited, these standards are being 
designed  based  on  best  currently  available  knowledge  for  managing  the  water 
environment. For later stages of the river basin planning cycle, to start after 2015, the 
standard-setting process will be subjected to scientific review.
These standards will be used to develop the classification schemes, as for example, 
each river in the UK will be assigned to one of five ecological status classes (high, 
good, moderate, poor and bad) or in case of failing to meet them, to one of the five 
ecological potential classes (maximum, good, moderate, poor or bad). Additionally, 
there will be two surface water chemical status classes (Good and Not Good). The 
“one out-all out” principle will decide their quality status; determined by the worst 
quality element, in case of good ecological status, or the worst chemical element in 
reference  to  good  chemical  status.  Furthermore,  a  surface  water  body  will  be classified also as “not  good” if the  standards for  one or more priority  substances 
(standards  to  be  agreed  at  EU  level)  or  dangerous  substances  (list  Annex  IX 
Directive) are exceeded. 
The Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)
The application of the polluter pays principle to the WFD asks water users to pay for 
the environmental and social damage associated with their negative impact on the 
water environment (EC, 2000). This covers the issue of property rights and basically 
represents the end of the “free lunches” era for private and institutionalised water 
resources management in Europe. For the first time, users have been asked to pay for 
the full costs of using the resource, including environmental and social costs, to assure 
that water resources are being sustainably managed (introduction of sustainable water 
pricing policies, for example, justification for volumetric charge for water abstraction 
in Scotland). 
CEA  is  an  optimisation  method  for  finding  the  lowest-costs  means  to  reach  an 
objective (Tietenberg, 1992). In the context of the WFD, the objective of the analysis 
is to achieve the desired environmental standards (Good Status) at the lowest possible 
costs to society as a whole. The prescription of the use of economic instruments, such 
as Cost Effectiveness Analysis for the selection of measures to achieve good status, is 
aimed  at  ensuring  efficiency  in  policy/action  design  and  to  avoid  unnecessary 
economic and financial costs. However, CEA does have limitations. 
Figure 2 shows a graphical interpretation of CEA for our hypothetical firm, assuming 
that the MAC curve is defined on the lowest cost set of options available to the firm to 
reduce  its  emissions  to  water  and  a  direct  cause-effect  relationship  between  the 
implementation  of  these  options  and  water  quality  improvements.  Accordingly, 
nitrogen emission reductions are shown on the horizontal axis, costs are shown on the 
vertical axis and the background reflects (for a case water body) the ecological status
5
class boundaries under the WFD (bad, poor, moderate, good and high), options are 
ranked in increasing order of their costs per emission reduction unit. Figure 2: The Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of water quality improvements options
The overall objective of the CEA is to minimise the incremental marginal costs of 
pollution  control  for  the  firm  (min  PCEA)  whilst  achieving  water  quality 
improvements to at least the point where the desired water quality levels are achieved 
(QGES). In figure 2, PCEA is the difference between the future (hypothetical) marginal 
costs of remediation measures (P
B) and the marginal costs of current practices (P
A),
which  may  well  be  zero  if  there  are  no  remediation  measures  already  in  place. 
Additionally, change in  water quality (Q) is  derived by  estimating the extent  of 
water quality improvements needed to achieve an specified environmental objective, 
QGES is the desired water quality situation, minus baseline water quality levels (QPS). 
As this is an analysis at the margin the area underneath the MAC curve is a total 
magnitude  and  it  can  be  measured/estimated  (Chiang,  1984).  In  consequence,  the 
scale of the additional compliance costs to reach GES for the firm under the WFD 
(additional  environmental  protection  costs  excluding  extra  regulation  costs)  is 
represented by the area formed by the points ABCD (PCEA in figure 2).  
                                                                                                                                           
5 Good status is the combination of good ecological status and good chemical status, for simplicity we 
now focus our analysis in the achievement of good ecological statusAs long as good ecological status is achieved (QGES), the objective is to find the set of 
remediation measures that would minimise this area. The extent of the total costs of 
compliance  with  the  Directive  would  depend  on  the  water  quality  improvements 
(level of standards) needed to reach GES and where the emission limits are set (EGES) 
by regulators to reach these objectives
6.  Note that this analysis is described without 
reference to benefits other than the prescribed level of good water status. 
Disproportionate Costs: a first interpretation
Consider now figure 3 that the same firm finds it too costly to reach GES and claims 
that it can only afford to abate to the point P
D (Y–axis). This point represents the 
firm’s maximum compliance effort with the Directive. 
Under the WFD, this situation leaves the firm with two possible options. First, the 
firm may either seek to be granted time-framed derogations/exemptions. This would 
allow the firm to  wait until  new abatement technologies are available,  which can 
reduce its overall marginal costs of compliance, and for the regulators there would be 
no need to lower the environmental standards. This means introducing some sort of 
flexibility in the speed of implementation, which the Directive already accounts for by 
allowing for different phases on the implementation of the River Basin Management 
Plans (2009-2015, 2015-2021 and 2021-2027). Alternatively, the firm may have a 
case to seek less stringent environmental objectives, and this would be represented at 
the point where P
D=MAC (B’).  
If the standard-setting derogation was allowed in this hypothetical case, based solely 
on  the  estimation  of  the  point  P
D,  the  additional  costs  for  the  firm  would  be 
represented by the Area AB’C’D (figure 3), and good ecological potential (GEP) 
could be found in theory by drawing a vertical line to the X-Axis, where P
D=MAC. 
The  lower  graph  in  figure  3  shows  the  situation  under  the  new  environmental 
objectives,  as  Ecological  Potential  would  have  different water  quality status  class 
boundaries to Ecological Status. The other conclusion is that the difference between P
D and P
B (i.e. the difference in the additional costs of achieving Good Ecological 
Status and Good Ecological Potential) represents P2 (area B’BCC’, in  figure 3) 
illustrating one interpretation of Disproportionate Costs. This situation could imply a 
re-design of the environmental standards for the specific water body and/or lowering 
the emissions limit previously set for the firm/water body.
                                                                                                                                           
6 For this analysis, we are assuming a direct relationship between water quality and emission 
reductions. We imply that EGES = QGESFigure 3: Graphical representation of Disproportionate CostsAssessment of disproportionality in theory 
The estimation of the point P
D may prove sufficient to justify time-frame derogations 
based  on  an  assessment  of  the  economic  viability  of  the  firm
7.  This  may  be  the 
simplest  interpretation  of  disproportionality,  but  one  which  is  based  on  cost-
effectiveness  alone.  CEA  is  an  optimisation  tool  but  it  does  not  provide 
optimal/efficient solutions as a whole. It does not try to maximise utility for all the 
economic  agents  involved,  but  to  reach  an  objective  at  least  costs  for  the  firm. 
Arguably, this interpretation of the Directive is incomplete. 
Ultimately, the change of objectives (from GES to GEP) needs to be sociably justified 
under the WFD. As suggested by pollution control theory, a social optimal considers 
more than just abatement costs; it is necessary to consider the full range of social and 
environmental damage costs  associated with the firm’s polluting activities
8. These 
costs in turn mirror the benefits derived from reducing pollution.  In other words, as 
pollution  is  reduced  in  a  water  body,  there  is  a  notional  function  reflecting  the 
increasing social benefits deriving from whatever uses are made of the river.   
This part of the story is considered in the marginal social cost (MSC) curve (see both 
figures  4  and  5).  This  curve  reflects  a  decrease  in  damage  costs  to  society  (or 
conversely reflects the social benefit). Initial low cost abatement delivers high social
costs, which progressively fall as the firm’s pollution control costs increase by one 
extra unit. From economic theory, a pareto-efficient level of pollution control (Q*) is 
found where MSC=MAC, and the optimal pollution control expenditure needed to 
internalise the damage produced by the firm should be set at P* (see figure 1).
Due to the uncertainties surrounding the monetary estimation of the damage costs 
functions, which are mainly associated with the economic valuation of environmental 
improvements
9, regulators normally set the standards under other criteria. In this case, 
GS is defined as a function of those environmental standards necessary to support the 
                                                
7 For practical purposes, these decision making steps would be similar to those used in the 
determination of Best Available Techniques (BAT) and the determination of BAT based permits 
conditions within Directive 96/61/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention control.
8 Note that this remains true even if the uses are passive or non use “existence” benefits. biology of the water environment, and therefore regulators have to presume that these 
standards would reflect to some extent society’s demand for environmental quality –
assuming the shape of the MSC curve (figure 4). Regulators assume the shape of the 
MSC curve by drawing the MSC line anywhere as long as this curve cuts the MAC 
curve where the desired water quality levels are found (point B in figure 4)
Figure 4: The Cost-Benefit Analysis, assuming the shape of the benefits function
However, Figure 5 shows the economic inefficiency of the standards-based system 
when the “real” MSC is introduced. In this hypothetical situation
10, the area BB’F 
(figure 5) represents the net loss to society as a whole, including the firm, of reducing 
pollution to QGES instead of Q*, which represents the “socially” desired level of water 
quality/pollution control. This introduces an economic justification for the firm to 
seek  the  lowering  of  environmental  standards,  and  for  the  regulators  to  at  least 
consider the claims on this basis. In this context then, disproportional should ideally 
                                                                                                                                           
9 More information on the contested issue of the use of environmental valuation in decision-making can 
be found in the following report (Ecologic, 2005). 
10 Note that for this analysis the “real” MSC curve has been drawn below the “regulators” MSC curve 
to show the economic inefficiencies associated with assuming the shape of the benefits curve. 
However, the “real” MSC curve could be plotted anywhere in the graph or have any other shape. It 
may even be the case that society’s perception of GES surpasses that of the scientific assessment. be judged with reference to cost and benefit curves, and therefore an application of 
Cost-Benefit  Analysis  (CBA).  CBA  is  a  decision-making  tool  which  is  explicitly 
highlighted  for  the  assessment  of  exemptions  in  the  WFD  literature  (European 
Commission 2000 and 2002; RPA 2004; Hanley and Black, 2006). 
Figure 5: Economic inefficiencies associated with assuming the shape of the damage 
costs curve
Lowering the environmental standards for a specific water body or allowing a polluter 
to maintain its emissions levels on the grounds of a disproportionality test, may prove 
one of the most controversial steps on the implementation of the WFD. Decisions may 
reveal issues of competitiveness between water users or uneven distribution of the 
financial costs associated with the Directive (Pearce 2004). Applying CBA presents a 
challenge, but it is a rational model to inform decision making processes (Pearce et al, 
2006). Benefit assessment in particular brings up some complex issues related to the 
process of valuation and the fact that some water bodies are more socially valuable in 
relative terms.  Despite this, political decisions regarding exemptions or derogations 
to  achieve  GS  should,  if  possible,  be  informed  by  the  appraisal  of  the  costs  and 
benefits  of  options  to  improve  water  quality,  with  the  underlying  objective  of achieving some sort of economic efficiency and coherence in the final decision.  If 
not, decision-makers may face an issue of conflicting rights between those who pay 
the costs of water quality improvements and those who benefit, as they may have 
overlooked the  extent  of the net  social costs  (area  BB’F in  figure  5)  involved in 
complying with the Directive.  
Assessment of disproportionality in practice
In this paper, we argue that a rational model to inform decisions on derogations is 
needed and that economic theory  provides a definition of disproportionate costs and 
the methodological tools that can inform its assessment. Using economic theory, we 
conjecture that ideally standard-setting derogations should be judged with reference to 
cost and benefit curves – an application of the CBA method. 
While  instructive,  the  application  of  theoretical  principles  to  water  resource 
management can be constrained by the realities of data and administrative capacity.   
A major stumbling block in the theoretical story is whether sufficient reliable benefits 
assessment data are available. These constraints are evident across Member States, 
with  differing  levels  of  economic  input  for  supporting  decisions.  The  practical 
application of the basic principles outlined in this paper presents a challenge. Figure 6 
offers  a  guide  to  the  main  methodological  steps  needed  for  the  assessment  of 
exemptions under the WFD. In order to better grasp the concept, we briefly introduce 
below the implications of using such a model for a hypothetical farm. We aim to 
answer  the  following  question:  what  information  would  be  needed  to  judge  if  a 
hypothetical farm should be granted exemptions?Figure 6 Methodological steps for the assessment of disproportionate costs
First of all, we are dealing with the simplest possible case. Independently of the types 
of derogations being sought, a preliminary cost-effectiveness analysis of all available 
measures  to  the  farmer  to  reduce  water  pollution  needs  to  be  undertaken  as  a 
requirement for the design of programme of measures to reach good status. Once all 
possible measures have been ranked in terms of their cost-effectiveness, the following 
information will be available: i) what measures are needed to reach good status; and 
ii) the extent of the total financial costs of reaching the stated objective. In this case, 
the use of abatement cost curves proves a valid and transparent management tool to 
support these types of decisions (Beaumont and Tinch 2004). This method provides 
an estimate of costs to reach a pre-defined level of abatement, and also reveals the 
most efficient path to this discharge level 
Once information about costs and effectiveness of measures has been collated, this 
needs to be compared with an assessment of the financial viability of the farm and the 
ability  by  the  farmer  to  absorb  the  additional  costs  of  protecting  the  water 
environment.  Ultimately,  this  will  determine  the  farmer’s  efforts  to  achieve  good 
status at particular water bodies (Lago et al. 2006). The use of financial indicators or 
income  ratios  provides  a  good  option  for  assessing  the  costs  of  meeting  the environmental requirements of the Directive at individual and sectoral level (DEFRA 
2006).  However,  there  is  a  need  to  distinguish  between  ability  to  pay  and 
affordability. This distinction is more subjective and controversial. 
If the viability assessment indicates that the application of the most cost effective 
selection of measures to achieve good status carry an unreasonable burden on farm 
incomes,  regulators  will  then  need  to  apply  derogation  tests,  which  will  differ 
depending on the type of derogations being sought.
For time-frame derogations, regulators can base their decision on the outcomes of the 
tests introduced above. In practice, this would basically involve doing nothing until 
the beginning of the next river basin management cycle. This fundamentally means 
just waiting until there are new abatement techniques available to reduce the farmer’s 
marginal costs of compliance. Essentially, there would not be a need to lower the 
environmental standards however, an appraisal of future pollution abatement options 
may prove useful at this stage. Once this is done, the whole cycle needs to be repeated 
for the next river management cycle – beginning again with CEA.
For standard-setting derogations, the analysis becomes more complex. The costs of 
reducing pollution at farm level need to be compared with the associated benefits of 
water quality improvements. The main rationale of applying benefit assessment of 
environmental  quality  improvement  is  that  the  lowering  of  the  environmental 
standards  needs  to  be:  i)  sociably justifiable  under  the  light  of  the  WFD;  and  ii) 
following economic theory, the optimal point of pollution control (where costs equal 
benefits)  is  the  only point  when  a  satisfactory  outcome  for  both,  society  and  the 
farmer  can  be  found.  As  we  have  introduced  in  this  paper,  the  rationale  for  the 
application of CBA to justify standard-setting derogations aims to find some sort of
economic efficiency on the exemptions decision making process.
There  are  evidently  many  uncertainties  associated  with  this  analysis,  which  are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  For example, in addition to the obvious challenges in 
benefits assessment, questions remain about the technical effectiveness of measures or 
best  management  practices  to  control  diffuse  pollution,  and  attribution  of  the responsibility to individual farmers.  These uncertainties are the subject of much on-
going research in Member States. 
Discussion 
Overall, the Water Framework Directive sets a clear course of action for many of its 
elements, including most of its economic elements. For example, to achieve Good 
Status and to reinforce the Polluter-Pays Principle and the Cost Recovery Principle, 
the WFD introduces a set of legal transposition requirements.  These oblige each 
member state to incorporate the Directive into their national law (e.g. case of the 
Water Environment Water Services (2003) Act in Scotland) and develop regulatory 
instruments  for  its  enforcement (e.g  case  of  the  Controlled  Activities  Regulations 
(2005)  in  Scotland).  The  establishment  of  pricing  policies  and  the  Programme  of 
Measures for water pollution control and reduction options are also normative and the 
failure to meet the objectives of the Directive punishable. 
However, for the assessment of derogations, the lack of official EU guidance on the 
use of CBA clearly stands out compared with the prescribed choice of CEA for the 
selection of measures to achieve Good Status. This raises a question as to whether the 
objectives of the Directive are set and enforceable, and about the role of CBA in 
European water policy. 
Ultimately the predefined objectives of the WFD, are independent of the costs of 
achieving  them,  as  these  goals  do  not  acknowledge  public  preferences  and  are 
completely independent of elicited human values (as they are set by the regulators). 
This has been called the “public-trust” doctrine, which makes the goal of policy in 
face of damages, the restoration of the pre-damage state of the environment (Pearce 
2002). Under the WFD, “Good Status” reflects a legal judgement about the role of the 
Commission as a trustee of citizen’s rights for environmental improvements. In this 
instance, the achievement of Good Status does not need to be justified. The benefits of 
action do not need to be estimated, and the value of the damage would be equal to the 
costs to restore the water environment. Consequently, the application of CEA to the 
selection of measures will suffice to reach Good Status at least costs.Nevertheless,  the  Directive  “recommends”  the  use  of  CBA  only  to  allow  for  a 
relaxation of its goals when the costs are found prohibitive. This differs from the 
normal use of CBA in policy analysis, which is widely used to justify policy choices. 
This clearly introduces discrepancies between the structure and ethos of the WFD and 
its implementation strategy. 
When  applying  CBA  for  the  assessment  of  individual/sectoral  cases  of 
disproportionality,  member  states  may  find  out  that  they  are  implementing  and 
enforcing a highly inefficient piece of legislation. If the costs of action outweigh the 
overall environmental benefits of the Directive, the question remains: is the Directive 
worth implementing? This is a dangerous road to take and definitely, an application of 
CBA not encouraged in the text of the WFD.
Secondly,  discrepancies  also  allow  flexibility  in  the  practical  interpretation  of 
disproportionate costs at member state level, which some countries may exploit to 
apply  different  definitions  of  disproportionality  and  different  methods  to  reach 
decisions about exemptions. 
Conclusion 
The WFD (EC, 2000) and subsequent guidance documents on the interpretation of its 
economic  elements  (EC,  2002)  provide  limited  guidance  on  the  meaning  of 
disproportionate costs for the justification for exemptions in the achievement of Good 
Status. This paper shows that economic theory provides a rudimentary definition and 
the methodological tools that can inform its assessment. 
Ideally disproportionate costs should be judged with reference to cost and benefit 
curves.    But  the  pursuit  of  CBA  opens  the  Directive  to  wider  interrogation  that 
questions its overall economic efficiency. 
Cost-Effectivenes Analysis alone provides a partial tool to justify derogations. But the 
decision-making tools used for the assessment of disproportionality under the WFD 
should  vary depending  on  the  nature  of  the  derogation  being sought.  These  tools 
mainly differing in the use/non use of benefit curves. For time-frame derogations, simple decisions can be based on an economic viability test of the firm, compared 
with the financial costs of the most cost-effective set of measures available to reach 
GS (outcome of the CEA).  For the justification of derogations on the basis of less 
stringent objectives it would also be necessary to know what gains in environmental 
quality can be achieved compared to the abatement costs – a full economic costs 
approach (Cost-Benefit Analysis) – to reach a “socially” optimal decision. If both the 
MAC and MSC curves are known, any policy responses based on this information 
would result in an efficient allocation of pollution control.
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